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 In this study, I explain-as other scholars have-the growing success of radical right parties 
in Europe. I also address conceptualization and classification issues. Contrary to other scholars, I 
compare party performance across two different elections: European and national. Also unlike 
the vast majority of studies that focus exclusively on Western Europe, this study looks more 
broadly at all members of the European Union, including those in Central and Eastern Europe. 
My main argument is that the radical right will perform better in European than in national 
elections. In explaining why parties should perform better in the former rather than the latter, I 
emphasize the impact of Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) second order national elections theory and its 
implications, and of the electoral system. I also test the impact of one of the most denominated 
determinants of the radical right success in national elections. My findings confirm that radical 
right parties generally perform better in European elections and that it is mostly because of their 
second order national contest nature. The electoral system is also significant, in cases where it 
differs across the the elections. Testing for the difference in the radical right parties’ performance 
between national and European elections and for the impact of various indicators on the success 
of the radical right in national elections also allowed me to reconsider the importance of some of 
the most denominated determinants of the success of the radical right and evaluate the validity of 
the second order national elections model.   
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Introduction 
Many observers and journalists emphasized the surprising success of extreme right wing 
parties in the elections to the European Union parliament in 2014, and expressed concerns about 
the recent growing support of right-wing extremism in Europe. However, if we closely look at 
radical right parties’ performance over the past several years, we observe that these assumptions 
are mostly incorrect and their predictions exaggerated. First, the radical right is not a recent 
phenomenon in Europe. Even though most of the theories about radical right parties are quite 
recent, some social scientists have tried to address the reasons for the radical right success for 
almost two decades. Betz (1994) points out that radical right parties started to grow as early as in 
the late 1980s. I argue that some of these parties emerged even earlier. Some parties have ties to 
fascism from the interwar and World War II periods, such as the Italian Social Movement – 
National Right (MSI-DN), which was founded in 1946 and gained 56 seats in the Italian 
parliament in 1972. Second, the success of the radical right is not constant or growing, but varies 
over time (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). For example, Ellinas (2010) observes how support for the 
French National Front took off in legislative elections in 1990s only to decrease in the next few 
elections. What most scholars have failed to observe is that the support for the radical right not 
changes only over time but also varies depending on the type of elections in which the party 
competes. This argument might offer a better explanation of the success of the radical right than 
the other common theories which have produced very inconsistent results. I argue that radical 
right parties will generally perform better in the European Union than in national elections. 
There might be several possible reasons for the variation in the party performance across these 
two types of elections. Here, I emphasize what I believe are the two most plausible explanations.  
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First, parties occasionally compete under different electoral rules in European and 
national elections. Maurice Duverger’s (1959) influential theory about mechanical and 
psychological effects of electoral rules emphasizes that voters in majoritarian systems think 
twice about casting their votes for smaller parties. According to Duverger, disproportionality of 
these systems causes underrepresentation and thus causes people to vote strategically to not waist 
their votes. The performance of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) across the two 
type of elections is a case in point. In 2015 national elections, under majoritarian electoral rules, 
UKIP gained only one seat in the House of Commons, whereas it won 27% of the vote in the 
elections to the European Parliament under proportional rules.  
Second, European elections are only ‘second-order national elections’ (Reif and Schmitt 
1980). This means that voters generally think of European elections as less important. Norris 
(2005, 151) further argues that elections to the European Union Parliament are simply a mid-
term referendum on national governments. This may influence the fortunes of radical right 
parties. The voters may be more tempted to vote for radical right parties in the European Union 
elections as they are less concerned about the possibility that extremists could actually govern 
them directly. The voters may also be more prone to listen to the simple messages of theses 
parties in the European elections, whereas in the national elections they will expect more detailed 
political program that covers a range of issues. Finally, the voter, by voting for the radical right 
in second-order European elections, may be sending a message of protest to the mainstream 
parties back home. Some scholars argued that it is not the second order national contest nature of 
the European elections that makes the smaller parties more successful in them, but particular 
European Union issues that smaller parties address in European elections (Ferrara and Weishaupt 
2004). Considering the anti-EU agendas of many radical right parties, this suggests another 
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reason we should expect them to perform better in the European Union rather than in national 
elections. 
As Mudde (2007) points out, the research about the radical right is limited to Western 
Europe. I include radical right parties from both Western and Eastern Europe. Studying radical 
right parties across the European Union avoids the problem of selection bias and selection on the 
dependent variable that could lead to biased estimates (Geddes 2003).      
The paper is organized as follows: I discuss important problems of categorization and 
coding which have affected the results of various studies about the radical right, suggest some 
propositions on how to overcome them, and provide an analysis of radical right parties which I 
include in my dataset. Second, I examine existing studies that which have tried to explain the 
support for the radical right. Third, I demonstrate how the type of elections affects the radical 
right vote and theorize about the reasons why radical right parties perform better in European 
elections. Finally, I test my arguments and analyze the findings.  
 
1) What is the radical right? 
 
 The scholarly work on the radical right has suffered through the years from often 
misleading and untested assumptions about radical right parties’ nature. These assumptions may 
seem logical at first glance, but do not work well in reality. Mistakes in classifying the individual 
parties, a lack of testing, and Western centrism are arguably the main reasons for the inconsistent 
results of the studies which have tried to explain the success of the radical right.  
As some of the studies about the radical right have correctly pointed out (Mudde 1995, 
2007; Ignazi 2003; Hainsworth 2008), there is not standard criteria according to which parties 
are classified and defined as radical right. This is potentially a critical problem for studies which 
are interested in comparing across states. One simply cannot be an expert on every country. No 
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clear definition of the characteristics of the radical right and a general lack of knowledge about 
particular parties may lead to the erroneous inclusion of some parties. The end result may include 
problems with testing and misleading findings. Therefore, there is a need to clearly establish the 
distinctive features of the radical right. Mudde’s (2007) study regarding the populist radical right 
is arguably the first large study dedicated mostly to the conceptualization and classification of 
these parties. As conceptualization and classification are not the main goals of this study, I 
follow Mudde and other scholars who have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to this issue. 
However, I also try to update their work and offer my own suggestions. 
Some scholars emphasized the problem of how this particular party family should be 
classified (Ferraresi 1996; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007). However, this study is not interested here 
in such terminological battles. In my opinion, it is of minimal importance whether the adjective 
in use is ‘extreme’ (Ignazi 2003) or ‘populist radical’ (Mudde 2007). Rather, it is crucial to 
understand what makes the party radical or extreme, and what distinguishes it from other 
political parties.  
In this study, I use the term radical right, which follows Mudde’s (2007) terminology. 
The term ‘radical’ stands for the harsh language that these parties adopt when addressing their 
political opponents (Betz & Johnson 2004), immigrants, minorities, globalization, and other 
issues. I believe that the same definition could be used for the term ‘extreme’ in this context. The 
selection of ‘radical’ is merely practical here as Mudde’s work is the one that I am using the 
most in this part of the study. More importantly, contrary to Mudde and other authors (i.e. Betz 
1994), I am not using the term ‘populist’. Populism can be defined as an ideological feature 
which “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
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expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543; 2007, 23). Although I recognize 
that populism is an important feature of modern radical right parties, I am not solely interested in 
the ‘populist’ radical right, but in the radical right generally. In practice, this means that I am not 
excluding the parties which Mudde codes as ‘nonpopulist’ radical right, and others call ‘extreme’ 
right (Ferraresi 1996; Bustikova & Kitschelt 2011), or ‘old’ and ‘traditional’ extreme right 
(Ignazi 1992, 2003). There are ideological differences among the parties, but I do not believe that 
subdivision is necessary for this study. Moreover, I argue that this division is also extremely 
difficult in practice and only adds to the existing conceptual chaos. I emphasize two reasons 
why.  
First, there are methodological problems that make this kind of distinction very difficult. 
Mudde (2007, 49) argues that ‘nonpopulist’ radical right parties are openly neofascist, 
undemocratic, elitist, and therefore non populist. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) argue that 
the ‘radical’ right pursues authoritarian objectives within the boundaries of the democratic 
system, while the ‘extreme’ right wants to replace democracy with authoritarianism. Ferraresi 
(1996, 10-11) claims that what he calls the ‘radical extreme’ right embraces violence and illegal 
means as a legitimate tool of political struggle. However, he acknowledges that this distinction is 
mostly conventional and cannot be followed too rigidly. In my opinion, none of these studies 
provide enough evidence for such a division. The theory regarding the necessary subdivision of 
the radical right is therefore based mostly on unproven assumptions about certain parties. This is 
caused by the fact that it would be difficult in practice to find enough evidence that a given party 
is explicitly neofascist, neo-Nazi, elitist or undemocratic. Such divisions also preclude 
comparative research and testing. 
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Radical right parties in particular are very careful not to overstep certain boundaries of 
political conformity erected by the democratic systems in which they compete. Most of the 
European postwar constitutions are explicitly antifascist. Therefore, open propaganda of fascist 
ideology and ties with the old regimes could potentially mean many years in prison for the 
parties’ leaders and members and the dissolution of the parties. In consequence, parties are 
usually very well aware of the limits of their rhetoric and actions. Radical right parties are as 
strategic as any other political parties. Generally, they find a ‘safe’ level of radicalization to 
avoid legal issues and remain attractive to a group of voters. On the other side of the political 
spectrum, communist parties face the same kind of issues, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
An example of how difficult it is to find sufficient evidence that the party is neofascist, 
neo-Nazi, and openly supports violence can be found in the failed attempts (2011, 2012) of 
German officials to ban the extremist NPD (National Democratic Party), which Mudde (2007, 
49) names as one of the main examples of the ‘nonpopulist’ radical right. The selection of 
‘democratic’ in the party name is hardly a coincidence. As argued above, radical right parties are 
strategic players. The more extreme the party’s real intentions, the more careful the party will be 
about openly expressing them.  
Second, contrary to Mudde, I do not believe that the presumed ties with fascism or more 
extreme anti-system positions necessarily mean that the party is elitist and not populist. Indeed, I 
believe that all modern radical right parties are populist to some extent, whatever their political 
doctrines. There is a clear overlap of issues between more and less extreme wings of the radical 
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right that makes a distinction among them based on populism very difficult. For example, the 
program of the German NPD looks very similar to any other populist radical right party1. 
To conclude, trying to forcibly make the separation between the less and the more 
extreme radical right seems to produce more damage than utility. For example, Golder (2003) is 
trying to make a similar distinction as other authors cited here, using similar criteria, and codes 
as neofascist some of the parties that Mudde codes as populist (i.e. British BNP). Therefore, 
although it is obvious that there are some differences between the single parties, I believe that to 
draw rigid boundaries between the subgroups of the radical right is often very difficult and too 
much emphasis on this issue has had only counterproductive results thus far. 
To classify radical right parties, we need to look for certain ideological features which 
distinguish them from other political parties. I agree with Mudde (2007) that the parties that are 
only populist or ethnoregionalist should not be included in the radical right party family. 
Recognizing the differences among these parties can sometimes be very tricky. First, one cannot 
be an expert on every party or pursue field research in all of the countries of Europe, and 
therefore must rely on secondary sources which are sometimes of questionable quality. Second, 
there is often scant data available on an individual party. Taking these two points into account, 
the classification used in this study is not without weaknesses. I acknowledge possible 
shortcomings in the coding of parties from countries which are out of my area of expertize. 
I do not believe that trying to enumerate vast and complex sets of distinctive features is 
plausible here. Considering the differences between parties and the continuous evolution of their 
agendas, it only adds to confusion and it may result in mistakes in classification that could lead 
to misleading results. Therefore, I use Mudde’s minimum definition (2007, 15) and emphasize 
                                                     
1 “Themen”, NPD, accessed October 31, 2015, https://npd.de/themen/. 
8 
 
 
 
only one truly distinctive feature of the radical right. This core feature is a radical form of 
nationalism that is similar to what Mudde (2007, 19) refers to as ‘nativism’ and defines it as a 
combination of nationalism and xenophobia. Radical right nationalism has to be understood in 
terms of this combination.  
Scholars have provided different definitions of nationalism. Benedikt Anderson (1983) 
defines the nation as an imagined community. It is imagined because, although its members do 
not necessarily know each other, they imagine that they live in some sort of communion 
together. This community is imagined both as limited by its borders and sovereign. Hobsbawm 
(1990) emphasizes the importance of proto-national bounds – or preexisted feelings of collective 
belongings – for the creation of such communities, and the necessity of units of territorial 
political organization for the modern nationalism. Anthony Smith (1987) suggests two other 
important features for nationalism: citizenship (in a legal sense) that connects classes and strata 
in a community of theoretical equals and insiders, and common culture that is expressed by 
shared meanings and values.  
Radical nationalists define the nation in a similar way, but with an emphasis on the 
exclusive character of their individual imagined communities. Everything that is outside the 
borders of the nation must be necessarily different. The nation in the eyes of radical nationalist is 
under continuous attack from the outside and therefore must be protected. Cofrancesco (1986, 
66-67) in explaining the differences between the left and the right, argues that the goal of the 
right is to defend roots and tradition. For the radical right this applies even more. Preserving 
homogeneity of the nation is its ultimate goal.  
Radical right parties built their ideology on a dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ emphasized 
by Connor (1994) in his book about ethnic nationalism. ‘Them’ can be distinguished from ‘us’ 
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by visible and also non-visible ‘cultural’ factors. The latter applies especially in the cases of 
ethnic minorities. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) use another dichotomy according to which 
the radical right should build their ideology: ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. The goal of the radical right 
parties is protection of the nation and preservation of national culture and traditions that are 
believed to be threatened by ‘them’.  
However, we should distinguish who is truly conceived here as an enemy and a threat. 
Radical right parties do not automatically see all of the other nations as enemies or inferior. In 
many cases, the parties follow at least to some extent De Benoist’s (1983) theory that nations 
should be considered different but equal. For instance, many parties believe in cooperation 
between individual European countries, even though with clearly defined boundaries and rules. 
They do not necessarily consider their nation superior to others. Some parties apply double 
standards regarding the sensitive theme of immigration. Immigrants from outside of Europe, and 
especially from Muslim countries, are seen as a real threat to the nation, whereas immigrants 
from other European countries, or non-European Christians, are arguably more acceptable to the 
radical right. For example, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), Heinz-Christian 
Strache, in reaction to the current refugee crisis in Europe, called for the building of an army 
patrolled fence on the Austrian border and for admitting Christian rather than Muslim refugees2. 
According to Grumke, radical right parties tend to cooperate with each other. He argues that 
‘ultranationalist’ ideologies of radical right parties which should erect walls between the single 
parties are in reality not a hurdle for cooperation between them. He believes that this is a 
consequence of globalization, which is conceived as a common enemy (Grumke 2013, 13). 
However, this is not always the case. For instance, Marine Le Pen–the head of the French 
                                                     
2 Heinz-Peter Bader. “Austrian far-right leader balmes U.S., NATO for migrant crisis.” Reuters, September 5, 2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/05/us-europe-migrants-austria-strache-idUSKCN0R50HP20150905. 
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National Front–and Gert Wilders–leader of the Dutch PVV–refused to cooperate with the 
Hungarian Jobbik party, the Greek Golden Dawn party, and the Bulgarian Attack party in the 
European Parliament3 even though they all share euroskeptic anti-globalization stances. 
Moreover, where there are disputes over territory and national minorities, as in the cases 
Slovakia and Hungary, the cooperation is barely imaginable.  
I suggest that in defining radical right parties, anti-immigration and anti-globalization 
policies are key additional features of radical right nationalism. They can both be considered 
implications of radical nationalist ideology and can be used as indications that the party is a 
member of the radical right party family.  
Anti-immigration and anti-minority policies are clear expressions of the nationalist 
beliefs examined above. Bustikova & Kitschelt (2011, 148) argue that appeals to the nation and 
to the significance of collective national identity are strong indicators that the party is a radical 
right one, and a strict refusal of immigration is the product of these appeals. Pardos-Prado (2015, 
352) claims that the emergence and stabilization of the radical right in Europe is a consequence 
of immigration, and that immigration is at the core of the radical right agenda. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, the radical right concentrates more on ethnic minority issues as levels of 
immigration are not as large as in Western Europe (Pirro 2014; Mudde 2007). With the current 
refugee crisis, there is growing Islamophobia and antipathy toward non-European immigrants 
among the public. As a result, many radical right parties in the CEE now see mass immigration 
as one of the most important issues on their agendas.  
The anti-globalization characteristics of the radical right are another important 
implication of radical nationalist ideology and strong indicators of the radical rightism of the 
                                                     
3 David O’Riordan. “Le Pen says no deal between National Front and Jobbik.” Politics.hu, June 6, 2014, 
http://www.politics.hu/20140606/le-pen-says-no-deal-between-national-front-and-jobbik/ . 
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party. Abedi’s (2004) term ‘anti-political establishment parties’ seems to be a good fit for radical 
right parties. The ‘global system’, usually seen as represented by the United States and 
multinational institutions like the European Union, is blamed for mass immigration, for 
threatening national sovereignty, and for consumerism that threatens the survival of national 
culture and the national economy. Former leader of the German NPD, Ugo Voigt, claims that the 
consequences of globalization are “poverty, unemployment, dismantling of social services, and 
environmental destruction” (Botsch & Kopke 2013, 38). Strache (FPO) blames the United States 
and NATO for the recent refugee crisis in Europe4. National governments and politicians are also 
often a target for the radical right. They are accused of serving the ‘global system’ and selling 
out their nations. In an interview with Hungarian Budapest Times, Márton Gyöngyösi, deputy 
leader of Jobbik’s parliamentary fraction, stated that blaming the EU and the West for the 
economic problems of the country is not enough and called the political elite of the country co-
responsible for the loss of all Hungarian national wealth and all Hungarian national property5. In 
some cases, radical right parties have been part of government coalitions and have become more 
integrated into the system (i.e. FPO in Austria in 2000). However, according to Hainsworth 
(2008, 11), this does not necessarily mean that they have completely abandoned their ideologies 
and values that lay outside the mainstream.  
The radical left-wing shares some anti-globalization characteristics with the radical right-
wing. However, there are clear differences between the two. The anti-systemic features of the 
radical right derive from radical nationalism, whereas the extreme left usually rejects nationalism 
                                                     
4 Heinz-Peter Bader. “Austrian far-right leader blames U.S., NATO for migrant crisis.” Reuters, September 5, 2015,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/05/us-europe-migrants-austria-strache-idUSKCN0R50HP20150905. 
5 J. Arthur White. “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen: liberalism and Zionism are the enemies, not Islam.” The Budapest 
Times, February 22, 2014, http://budapesttimes.hu/2014/02/22/jobbik-to-wilders-and-le-pen-liberalism-and-
zionism-are-the-enemies-not-islam/ . 
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following the Marxist tradition. Following Bobbio’s universal distinction between right and left 
according to their attitudes towards the value of equality, leftists are egalitarians and give 
importance to what makes people more equal, even though they recognize that there is no perfect 
equality. Rightists, on the other hand, give more importance to what makes people unequal 
(Bobbio 1994, 71). Egalitarians believe that inequalities are mostly social and as such can be 
eradicated. Anti-egalitarians believe that inequalities are natural and cannot be eradicated (1994, 
67). Therefore, the extreme left should be defined as ‘anti-liberal egalitarianism’, whereas 
extreme right ‘anti-liberal anti-egalitarianism (Backes 2010, 172).    
 
2) European radical right parties   
 
 As suggested by Mudde (2000a, 23-24; 2007, 39), I believe that qualitative content 
analysis is the best method to classify radical right parties. I include the most relevant radical 
right party for each country that competed in the European Union elections and the closest 
national elections. I do not believe that it is necessary to discuss here all individual parties and 
their features. I have no reason not to follow to a large extent Mudde’s (2007) classification. His 
dataset, however, needs to be updated. For this sake, I provide my own analysis where I believe 
this is needed. The list of the parties that I code as radical right can be found in the appendix. I 
divide the parties into three groups here.  
The first group consists of radical right parties that have been included by Mudde and 
have been a part of the European party systems for many years, and as such do not need any 
further introduction. These parties have also been included by almost all of the scholars 
dedicated to this subject. Among these parties we can count the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), 
the Belgian Flemish interest-former Vlaams Blok (VB), the Brtish National Party (BNP), the 
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Danish People’s party (DF), the French National Front (FN), the German Republikaner (REP) 
and the National Democratic Party (NPD)6, the Italian League North (LN), and the Swedish 
Sweden Democrats (SD).  
 
The second group consists of the parties that Mudde includes, but are not always included 
in datasets. This is the result of studies either being out of date or Western-centric. There are no 
reasons not to believe that these parties should be classified as radical rightist. These parties 
include: The Bulgarian Attack (Ataka), the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), the Polish League of 
the Polish Families (LPR), the Portuguese Renovator Party (PNR), the Romanian Greater 
Romania Party (PRM), the Slovakian National Party (SNS), and the Slovenian National Party 
(SNS).  
The third group consists of the parties that Mudde does not include. I believe that this is 
primarily because he considers them non populist or not radical enough. Some of them also 
might not have existed when he wrote his book. Among these parties we can count the Cypriote 
ELAM which is a sister party of the Greek Golden Dawn; the Czech Worker’s Party (DSSS, 
previously DS) and Tomio Okamura’s Party of Direct Democracy (SPD) that has yet to compete 
in an election; the already mentioned Greek Golden Dawn; the Hungarian Movement for better 
Hungary (Jobbik); the Italian neofascist Casa Pound, which under the label “Sovranita” 
(Sovereignty) supports Matteo Salvini’s League North; the Latvian National Alliance; the 
Maltese Imperium Europa (IE); the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) of Gert Wilders; the Polish 
National Movement (RN), which in the October 2015 national elections–as a part of the 
Kukiz’15 movement (total 42 seats)–gained 9 seats in parliament; and other smaller parties. In 
                                                     
6 Mudde does not include NPD, because he does not consider it a populist party. I have discussed my reasons why to 
include it in the previous parts of this study. 
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none of these cases are there reasons to doubt the parties’ radical right affiliation. That is 
unfortunately not the case for the other parties in this group. Among those are the Estonian 
EKRE, the Finnish Finns Party (PS), the Lithuanian Order and Justice (TT), the Polish Congress 
of the New Right (KNP), and the British Independence Party (UKIP). However, after analysis of 
these parties’ programs, speeches and interviews with their leaders, and the public image they 
possess, I conclude that although there may be some doubts about radical nationalism and anti-
systemic character of these parties, there are enough indicators to include them in our dataset. 
For example, the Estonian EKRE - which was one of the most questionable parties - states in its 
manifesto that the demographic situation of the country does not allow any new mass migration. 
The main values of the party are family and fatherland, and the party stands against the 
destructive ideas of cultural Marxism, multiculturalism, and postmodern liberalism7. Moreover, I 
have profited from writing this study during the period of a large refugee crisis in Europe. The 
mentioned parties’ reactions to the crisis were generally quite similar in their content to the 
reactions of any other radical right party examined here, supporting their assumed radical right 
affiliation. Finally, the incentives for the voter to vote for one of these parties will arguably be 
the same or similar to those for any other radical right party examined here.     
 
3) Explaining the support for radical right parties 
 
 After introducing the conceptualization and classification of the radical right, I 
concentrate on the main goal of the research which is to explain the varying rate of success of the 
radical right. As was previously mentioned, the support for the radical right is not constantly 
growing (Elinas 2010; Mudde 2014). Instead, it varies quite unpredictably over time. This makes 
it difficult to identify the factors which could generally explain why people give their votes to the 
                                                     
7 “Bauska Deklaratsioon”, EKRE, accessed October 29, 2015, http://ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/. 
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radical right. Commonly denominated determinants of the success of the radical right have 
largely proven unable to explain the vote for radical right parties across countries and elections. 
This may have been caused, among other reasons, by the measurement problems of these 
potential causes.  
I argue that one of the best explanations for the success of the radical right is the type of 
elections in which the party competes. I expect the radical right to generally perform better in 
European rather than in national elections. Moreover, the factors which have been proven largely 
inconsistent in explaining the electoral fortune of the radical right in national elections, may be 
more useful in explaining the difference in the radical right performance between different 
elections, which would suggest their persistent importance for radical right voting theories. I 
therefore separate out the potential causes of electoral success for the radical right in national and 
European elections. 
 
Explanations for the success of the radical right in national elections      
 The political climate of distrust and disenchantment has been seen as a precondition for 
the success of the radical right (Betz 1994, 67). From this perspective, the vote for the radical 
right can be seen as a mere protest vote and the radical right parties as ‘parties of discontent’ 
(1994, 38). However, Betz admits that the protest vote does not have an absolute impact on the 
success of the radical right, as radical right parties and electorates violate the conditions 
necessary for the protest vote theory to apply. First, voters of radical right parties are not 
disinterested in politics. Second, traditional radical right parties in Western Europe managed to 
extend their electoral base and develop strong loyalties among their voters. Finally, radical right 
voters have been proven to have a distinct ideological identity (1994, 61-63). Therefore, the 
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politics of resentment should be rejected as a pure interpretation of the vote for the radical right 
and different ideological, socio-economic, and institutional determinants of the electoral fortune 
of radical right parties should be explored.  
 Often denominated determinants of the vote for the radical right are anti-immigration 
sentiments on the public demand side, and parties’ ethnocentric and xenophobic appeals against 
immigration and ethnic minorities on the party supply side. Betz (1994:64) argues that what most 
clearly differentiates the voter of the radical right is the importance he or she gives to certain 
issues. Immigration is arguably the most important of them. But is immigration the sole reason 
why a voter selects a radical right party?  
According to Art (2011, 4), theories about immigration determining the electoral fortunes 
of radical right parties are contradicted by examples of countries where high levels of 
immigration did not lead to electoral success for the radical right. The main example here, 
according to Art, is the case of Sweden. The selection of the Swedish example is unfortunate as 
the radical rightist Sweden Democrats gained 20 seats in Swedish Parliament already in 2010, 
and 29 seats with almost 13% percent of votes in the last parliamentary elections in 2014. 
According to some recent polls, they are now even considered the most powerful Swedish party8. 
Nevertheless, Art may still be correct that rates of immigration do not generally determine the 
success of the radical right. However, I believe that it is not because immigration issues are not 
important to radical right voters, but because immigration rates are not good estimators of the 
politics of immigration. I will address this further below.       
                                                     
8 Richard Orange, “Anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats now the biggest party, according to poll.” The Telegraph, 
August 20, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11814498/Anti-immigrant-Sweden-
Democrats-now-the-biggest-party-according-to-poll.html. 
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 Golder (2003, 441), in his cross-national quantitative study assumes that “higher levels of 
immigration help extreme right parties”. He argues that if there is a conviction that immigrants 
are a threat to national identity and culture, then voters have “no option than vote for the extreme 
right” (2003, 439). In his model, Golder estimates immigration using the percentages of foreign 
born populations in the individual countries. He finds positive results for his hypothesis when the 
vote is for parties that he codes as populist. However, there are several problems here. First, 
Golder does not include any Eastern European country in his dataset. In some of the Eastern 
European countries, like Hungary for instance, the foreign-born populace is almost nonexistent 
and yet there exist successful radical right parties. Second, I argue that the foreign born 
population is not a good measure for immigration. As Golder (2003, 445) himself points out, 
people do not necessarily know how many immigrants live in the country. And even if they 
would know, I argue that what is important are their negative perceptions about migrants and 
immigration. People do not necessarily see a large number of foreigners in their homeland as a 
problem. Finally, key targets of the radical right are illegal migrants. The foreign born population 
variable does not take illegal immigrants into account. 
 The studies testing similar hypotheses as Golder on the local level produced mostly 
consistent results about the impact of immigration on the vote for the radical right. Bonnetain´s 
(2004) study about variation of extreme right voting in France demonstrates that high levels of 
immigration have a positive impact on the radical right party’s performance. Rink, Phalet, and 
Swyngedouw (2008), in testing the factors that suppose to determine electoral success of the 
Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB), come to the conclusion that a large immigrant population will 
increase support for the party. However, these hypotheses still cannot be considered to have an 
absolute value. Generally, the problems with the immigration rates as an estimate for 
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immigration persist. For example, in Eastern Germany there is only a very small, if any, 
immigrant populace, and yet the extremist NPD usually performs better there than in Western 
Germany where the immigrant populace is significantly larger. Moreover, the anti-immigrant 
rallies of the PEGIDA9 movement, which is based in Dresden, attracted thousands of people in 
Eastern German cities, while mostly failed to have similar success in Western German cities10. 
Therefore, immigration rates do not seem to fit as an absolute determinant of the success of the 
radical right.   
This does not necessarily mean that the issue of immigration should be immediately 
rejected as a cause for the vote for the radical right. I believe that other estimates for immigration 
are preferable. I rely on Eurobarometer public surveys regarding the most salient national 
concerns. The use of surveys should better reflect negative perceptions of immigration among 
the population and take account of opinions about illegal immigration. It also shows the 
generalized significance of the issue in society. It is clear that not all of the people who expressed 
the belief that immigration is the most important issue that their country faces will necessarily 
vote for the radical right. However, we can assume that it is almost certain that most radical right 
voter will be among them. The use of surveys may be problematic for radical right studies, as 
voters are usually reluctant to admit their support for such parties (King 1997; Bloom 2003). 
Nevertheless, in this case people expressed their concerns with certain issues and not their direct 
support for a particular party. Therefore, I believe that there is no reason to doubt their sincerity 
in this case.  
                                                     
9 Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident. 
10 “Record numbers of anti-PEGIDA protesters in Germany.” DW, January 1, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/record-
numbers-of-anti-pegida-protesters-in-germany/a-18186886. 
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In the pan-European context, there may be another problem in explaining the vote for the 
radical right through immigration. It is assumed that in Central and Eastern Europe, immigration 
should not be a concern as there are few immigrants. Pirro (2014, 247) argues that explaining the 
electoral performance of radical right parties in terms of negative perceptions toward 
immigration is not very useful in the countries where immigration is not a salient issue. 
However, I believe the assumption that immigration is not a salient issue in the CEE might be 
erroneous. The previously mentioned case of Eastern Germany demonstrates that it is possible to 
gain electoral support with programs based on anti-immigrant policies even though there are 
only a few immigrants in the country or region. Again, I argue that what matters here is the belief 
that immigration is a concern, and not how many immigrants are in the country. I believe that the 
CEE countries are similar to Eastern Germany. Indeed, the reactions of the public in the CEE to 
the recent refugee crisis seems to confirm this assumption. Public opinion in the CEE is almost 
unanimously against accepting asylum seekers from countries outside Europe, and especially 
from Muslim or African countries. Islamophobic and anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread 
around the CEE countries even though there are low numbers of Muslims and immigrants from 
outside Europe in these countries.  
Some scholars argue that more important than immigration in the CEE should be the 
issue of ethnic minorities (Mudde 2005; Pirro 2014). However, the testing for the impact of 
ethnic minorities on the radical right vote in the CEE has quite surprisingly mostly negative 
results. Bloom (2013) concludes that the large minority population in Latvia did not have a 
positive impact on the vote for extreme right. Not only the numbers but also the negative 
sentiments about minorities do not seem to increase voteshare of radical right parties. For 
instance, in the Czech Republic, where xenophobic sentiments against the Roma population and 
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anti-Roma rallies are quite common phenomenon, radical right parties mostly failed to gain any 
success in both national and European elections. Although the vast majority of the existing 
studies about the most successful radical right party in the CEE–Hungarian Jobbik–argues that 
the party’s success should be tied with a growing anti-Roma sentiment in the country (i.e. Barlai 
& Hartleb 2011), Varga (2014) in his qualitative study argues that there is no empirical evidence 
for these statements. He demonstrates with compelling evidence that Jobbik profited more from 
the economic discontent of the population than from anti-minority sentiment, and gained success 
only after a radical shift in the party program from anti-Roma issues to economic issues in 2010.      
Because of problems with the inconclusive findings of studies and measurement and data 
problems, I do not test here for the impact of the size of ethnic minorities on the radical right 
vote and, as explained above, I believe that immigration is now an important issue in the CEE as 
well. Therefore, there should not be a problem in testing for immigration as a determinant of the 
radical right success even in the CEE countries.  
Worsening economic conditions expressed by high levels of unemployment is arguably 
the most often cited economic indicator of the success of the radical right. I believe that the 
assumption that unemployment matters derives from the quite common belief that the typical 
radical right voter comes from a lower stratum of society that is usually more vulnerable to 
unemployment problems. Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2008) find significant evidence that 
voters for the Belgian VB are more likely be people with lower socio-economic status. However, 
this might be the case in Belgium, but not necessarily in all of the European countries. Bustikova 
and Kitschelt’s (2011, 171) cross-national study concludes that there is a variation in socio-
demographic profiles of radical right voters and therefore it is “impossible to create a unified, 
cross-national profile of a radical-right voter”. Cross-national studies (Norris 2005; Arzheimer 
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and Carter 2006) do not seem to find evidence that high rates of unemployment alone would 
have a positive impact on the electoral fortunes of the radical right.  
Golder (2003, 439) argues that “unemployment increases the vote for extreme right 
parties when immigration is high, and unemployment does not affect (or lowers) the voteshare 
received by extreme right parties when immigration is low”. National level studies testing the 
impact of unemployment, and of the interaction between high levels of immigration and high 
levels of unemployment, ended up with inconsistent results. Bonnetain (2004) argues that in the 
case of France, unemployment, as immigration, has a positive impact on extreme right voting. 
Rink, Phalet, and Swyngedouw (2008) did not find significant evidence of unemployment 
increasing the support for the VB, even where the immigrant population is sufficiently large. 
Finally, Bloom (2013) concludes that in Latvia the combination of worsening economic 
conditions and a large minority population did not have a positive, but indeed a negative, impact 
on the performance of the radical right.  
Type of electoral system is often mentioned as an institutional factor that is expected to 
affect the electoral performance of radical right parties. According to Jungerstram-Mulders 
(2003, 29), “different political systems provide different opportunities and limitations for Far 
Right parties to succeed in the electoral arena”. In general, the type of electoral system is 
considered to have significant effects on the electoral fortunes of the smaller parties (Duverger 
1959; Eatwell 2000). Some scholars have argued that the more proportional the electoral system, 
the greater are the chances for extreme right candidate to be elected. By contrast, the less 
proportional the electoral systems, the more discouraged will be the voters to select the extreme 
right candidates (Jackman and Volpert 1996). This logic follows Duverger’s theory about the 
mechanical and psychological implications of the majoritarian system. As the party needs always 
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to have a majority to win a seat in parliament, the smaller parties have only limited chances to 
get any representation. They will probably be unable to perform better than the larger parties 
every time. The system is therefore disproportional, because the percentage of vote does not 
determine the level of representation gained. For example, the British UKIP won almost 13% of 
votes in the last parliamentary elections, but only held one seat in the House of Commons. As the 
voters are well aware of this, they will most likely prefer not to waste their votes and select the 
party that has better chances of getting more seats in the parliament (Duverger 1959, 226-26).  
Some scholars do not find enough evidence that proportionality of the electoral system 
has significant effects on the electoral success of the radical right (Carter 2004; Norris 2005). 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) even find a significantly positive impact of disproportionality on 
the success of the radical right. Surprisingly, their study does not include Great Britain which 
contrary to most other European countries, has a majoritarian electoral system. In a cross-
national study focusing on national parliamentary elections, it would be problematic to find 
empirical evidence for the significance of the electoral system, as the vast majority of European 
countries adopt proportional electoral systems. However, testing for the difference between party 
performances in national versus European parliamentary elections permits me to directly 
compare the performance of the same party under different electoral rules, and therefore to 
reevaluate the importance of the electoral system for the success of the radical right. 
 
Comparison of radical right performance in EU and national elections 
 The variation in the success of radical right parties between national and European Union 
elections remains largely understudied. This is quite surprising to me as it seems that the radical 
right has performed consistently better in European Union than in national elections. One of the 
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few scholars that has mentioned the possibility of this variance is Almeida (2012). He argues that 
electoral breakthroughs of selected radical right parties suggest that “radical right parties face a 
more favorable opportunity structure in the context of European Parliament elections than in 
national first-order contests” (2012, 141). However, his study is more centered on the impact of 
European integration and does not compare the performance of single radical right parties across 
national and European Union elections. Reif (1984) suggested that extremist parties generally 
perform better in second-order national elections, but again does not provide a comparison of 
single radical right parties’ performances. Hix and Marsh (2007, 501) tested for the radical right 
gains and losses in European Union elections, nevertheless it is not quite clear how they have 
classified radical right parties, and therefore which parties they include or exclude.  
I emphasize the type of election as a possible determinant for the success of the radical 
right and compare radical right parties’ performances in European parliamentary elections with 
the same parties’ performances in national parliamentary elections. From the first part of the 
study, it should be clear which parties I include and why. I discuss and test the possible causes of 
the expected difference in the vote. This kind of testing also allows me to reevaluate the 
importance of some of the indicators of electoral success of radical right parties that I have 
discussed here. I emphasize two possible causes of difference in the party performance between 
the two elections: the second order national contest nature of European Union elections, and the 
already discussed electoral system.  
European parliamentary elections are often viewed as ‘second-order national 
competition’ (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Norris 1997, 
2005). That is because “they are secondary to the main (national) electoral contest, and they are 
‘national’ contests rather than ‘European’ contest” (Hix and Marsh 2007, 496). Reif and Schmitt 
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(1980) argue that voters may vote differently in second-order national elections, and favor 
smaller rather than larger parties. Reif (1984), as previously mentioned, also suggests that more 
extreme parties would gain more seats in second-order national contests. There might be two 
possible reasons for this. First, voters might vote more sincerely, rather then strategically, in 
second-order national elections (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Second, the voters 
might see European Union elections as a useful tool for them to express their dissatisfaction with 
the national government (Hix & Marsh 2007). 
The questions that different studies try to answer are how much European Union issues 
matter in European elections (Norris 1997; Marsh 1998; Hix & Marsh 2007; Hobolt, Spoon and 
Tilley 2008), and therefore to what extent European elections are truly second-order national 
contests. Although some scholars suggest that the nature of European Union elections has 
changed, and that European issues have begun to matter (Ferrara and Weishupt 2004; Hobolt, 
Spoon and Tilley 2008), others conclude that European parliamentary elections are still to a large 
extent second-order national contests (Norris 1997; Hix and Marsh 2007). Although I do not 
fully discard the possibility that European concerns matter more than they used to, this may be 
caused by the fact that European issues have simply become more important in the domestic 
political arena (Hix and Marsh 2007, 499; Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2008: 112). Considering 
this, I argue that it will more likely be the implications of a second-order national elections 
model that makes radical right parties perform better in European Union elections.  I emphasize 
three features of the second order model that should help us understand why radical right parties 
should perform better in elections for the European parliament. 
First, the aforementioned issue of sincere versus insincere voting might matter. People 
who vote in national elections for a party that has better chances of forming a government, but 
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who on ideological, group identity, or personal grounds prefer another party, are voting 
insincerely. The same voters may be more sincere in European elections and cast a vote for the 
party they like best. The consequence is that relatively insignificant parties on the national level 
perform better on the European level (Marsh 1998, 593; Almeida 2012, 141). The voter can also 
move instrumentally from sincere choice in national elections to insincere in European elections 
in order to express temporary dissatisfaction with his or her party (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996, 303-29). The critical fact is that European elections do not select the national 
government. When voters are relieved of this kind of responsibility, their behavior may take a 
different course (Marsh 1998, 597).   
Second, second-order national elections are assumed to be of less importance. 
Significantly lower turnouts in European elections suggest that people largely assume that these 
election do not matter (Marsh 1998, 597). I argue that this conviction is present among the 
people who vote in these elections as well. The consequence is that a voter might be less afraid 
to select candidates that are considered controversial or radical. Here as well, the crucial factor is 
that these elections do not select the national government, and therefore do not personally affect 
the voters in individual countries. 
Finally, the single-issue vote is more likely in European Union elections. In first-order 
national elections, voters have to consider a complex set of issues, as the choice of the national 
government is assumed to have direct effects on many aspects of their lives. Therefore, the voter 
in a first-order national election will most likely not select the parties that do not address fully 
these issues. In second-order elections, on the other side, the national government is not selected 
and the voter, in consequence, might vote for a party just because of the single domestic issue 
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that concerns him or her the most. In the radical right case, this will arguably be the problem of 
immigration. 
    
Table 1 - The Radical Right in National and European Union elections 2014 
Country Party 
National 
Elections 
European Elections 
(2014) 
Electoral 
System 
Austria FPO 20.5% (2013) 19.72% proportional 
Belgium VB 3.7% (2014) 4.26% proportional 
Bulgaria Ataka 4.5% (2014) 2.96% mixed 
Croatia HNS 2.8% (2011) 6.88% proportional 
Cyprus ELAM 1.08% (2011) 2.69% proportional 
Czech Rep. DSSS 0.86% (2013) 0.52% proportional 
Denmark DF 12.3% (2015) 26.60% proportional 
Estonia EKRE 8.1% (2015) 4.00% proportional 
Finland PS 17.6% (2015) 12.90% proportional 
France FN 3.66% (2012) 24.86% majoritarian 
Germany NPD 1.5% (2013) 1% mixed prop 
Greece GD 6.3% (2015) 9.39% proportional 
Hungary Jobbik 20.3% (2014) 14.67% mixed prop 
Italy LN 4.10% (2013) 6.15% mixed prop 
Latvia NA 16.6% (2014) 14.25% proportional 
Lithuania TT 7.3 % (2012) 14.25% mixed 
Malta IE 
bellow 0.5% 
(2013) 
2.68% proportional 
Netherlands PVV 10.1% (2012) 13.32% proportional 
Poland KNP 1.06% (2011) 7.15% proportional 
Portugal PNR 0.31% (2011) 0.46% proportional 
Romania PRM 1.47% (2012) 2.70% mixed prop 
Slovakia SNS 4.6% (2012) 3.61% proportional 
Slovenia SNS 2.2% (2014) 4.04% proportional 
Sweden SD 12.9% (2014) 9.67% proportional 
United 
Kingdom 
UKIP 12.6% (2015) 26.77% majoritarian 
Sources: for the European Union elections - official website of the European Parliament 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/). For the national elections - IFES election guide 
(http://www.electionguide.org/), and other national level sources. 
 
In table 1, we can observe the differences in radical right parties’ performances across the 
2014 European Union elections and the closest national elections. In most cases, the radical right 
performed better in European Union elections. However, we have some negative cases as well, 
most notably Hungary and Finland. Both cases can arguably be explained by the fact that we can 
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hardly consider the Jobbik and the Finns party small parties anymore. Both of them are among 
the most powerful parties in their countries. Therefore, voters might not be reluctant to vote for 
them in national elections, and the second-order national elections theory does not apply 
anymore. In four cases the distance between the elections was more than two years. Obviously, 
time can have some effects here. The incentives of voters can change over time, and parties can 
suffer internal crises, changes of leadership, or face different sort of scandals that could influence 
their fortunes in different elections. Unfortunately, I cannot control for this kind of problems, and 
I acknowledge that the time issue can be one of the possible shortcomings of this study. 
From the discussion above derives the main hypothesis of this study: The type of election 
in which it competes will have an impact on the success of the radical right party. Radical right 
parties will most likely perform better in second-order national European Union elections than 
in first-order national parliamentary elections.  
 
4) Models and variables 
I use quantitative methods to test my hypothesis for the difference in success of radical right 
parties in national and European elections. First, I use a paired t-test model to compare radical 
right parties’ performances in European and national elections. Second, I use two ordinary least 
squares regression analysis models to explain the difference in party performances between the 
two types of elections, and to reexamine the impact of the various explanatory variables for the 
electoral fortunes of the radical right in national parliamentary elections. The obvious problem of 
the two ordinary least squares regression models is the small number of observations, which 
might affect the reliability of the results. The results of the testing therefore do not have an 
absolute value, however they demonstrate significance and offer interesting suggestions. In the 
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future, the inclusion of more elections should provide the quantitative testing with more 
reliability.   
In the first model, I test the hypothesis that radical right parties generally do better in 
European Union elections in comparison to national elections. I employ a paired t-test model11 
that allows me to demonstrate the average difference in the parties’ performances between the 
two elections, and the statistical significance of this difference. This model has two dependent 
variables. First, National elections, is the voteshare of the radical right in the closest national 
parliamentary elections to the respective European Union elections. Second, EU elections, is the 
voteshare of the radical right in European Union elections. The first paired t-test compares the 
voteshare of the radical right in elections for the European parliament in 2009 with the voteshare 
of the radical right in the corresponding national parliamentary elections. The second does the 
same for the 2014 European Union and corresponding national parliamentary elections, and the 
third for the combination of the two sets. I have only 23 observations in 2009 to 25 in 2014. That 
is caused by the fact that in Estonia, to my knowledge, there was no radical right party 
competing in the 2009 elections, and Croatia was not a member of the European Union in 2009 
and therefore had no European elections that year. Both datasets exclude the countries where 
there is no radical right party: Ireland and Luxembourg. Spain is also excluded because, although 
the radical right exists there, it is so marginal that it was impossible for me to find voteshares of 
any of the radical right parties for all sets of elections. 
In the second model, I test for the indicators that possibly cause variance in the vote for 
the radical right between European and national elections. The dependent variable is the 
difference in the voteshare of the radical right between European and national elections 
                                                     
11 Rosie Shier. “Paired t-tests.” Mathematics Learning Support Center, accessed October 30, 2015, 
http://www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/paired-t-test.pdf. 
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(European – national). I have four independent variables. First, immigration the most important 
national concern, captures peoples’ perceptions about immigration. Second, tendency not to trust 
the national government, expresses peoples’ mistrust in their national governments. Third, 
tendency not to trust the European Union, stands for peoples’ mistrust of the European Union. 
Finally, electoral system, measures whether the electoral system is majoritarian or proportional. 
I use Eurobarometer survey data from the beginning of the year 2010 for the 2009 set, 
and from the end of the year 2014 for the 2014 set. As already explained, I believe that 
Eurobarometer surveys present the most accurate estimates, especially for immigration. To 
estimate the effects of the proportionality of the electoral system, I put 100% score for the 
countries that adopt majoritarian electoral system – United Kingdom and France, and 0% score 
for the countries that use more proportional electoral rules. Similarly to the previous model, I test 
for the two sets of elections first separately and then combined. The two sets combined give me 
the possibility to enlarge my number of observations and support the results obtained in the 
single set tests.  
 Other variables for trust in national and European institutions could be added to the 
model. I did not include them in my model for three reasons. First, since my model does not 
contain a large number of observations, inclusion of more independent variables could cause 
problems with the degrees of freedom. Second, in pre-testing of the model, all of these variables 
were largely insignificant. Finally, I believe that the used trust variables generally capture the 
perceptions of the people about the national government, and the European Union.  
In the third model, I test for the impact of the discussed factors on the increase of the 
radical right vote in national parliamentary elections. The dependent variable, national, is the 
voteshare of the radical right in the most recent national parliamentary elections. The first two 
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independent variables, immigration the most important national concern and tendency not to 
trust the national government, express exactly the same as in the previous model. Two added 
variables are unemployment, which captures the unemployment rates for each country, and 
unemployment*immigration, which measures the interaction between unemployment and 
concerns about immigration.  
For measuring the concerns about immigration and tendency not to trust the national 
government, I use Eurobarometer surveys from the years when the election took place (2011-
2015). For unemployment, I use the rates for each year and each country provided by eurostat12. 
As this model is used mostly to demonstrate the possible differences in the importance of the 
same independent variables across European Union and national elections, I include only the 
most recent national elections from the years 2011 till 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 “Unemployment rate, 2003-2014.” Eurostat, accessed October 30, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Table_2_Unemployment_rate,_2003-2014_(%25).png  
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Results 
Table 2 –Model 1 
The radical right performance in 2009 European and corresponding national elections 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
EU elections 23 0.0773087 0.0112003 0.0537147 .0540807    .1006367 
national elections 23 0.0645522 0.0111984 0.0537057 .0413281    .0877763 
diff 23 0.0127565 0.0072761 0.0348949 -.0023332    .0278462 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9533         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0935          Pr(T > t) = 0.0467 
            
The radical right performance in 2014 European and corresponding national elections   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
EU elections 25 0.094196 0.0162859 0.0814283 .0605836    .1278084 
national elections 25 0.070752 0.0131098 0.0655488 .0436948    .0978092 
diff 25 0.023444 0.0128206 0.0641029 -.0030164    .0499044 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9600         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0799          Pr(T > t) = 0.0400 
            
The radical right performance in 2009 and 2014 sets combined 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
EU elections 48 0.0861042 0.0100095 0.069348 .0659676    .1062407 
national elections 48 0.0677813 0.0086047 0.0596149 .0504709    .0850916 
diff 48 0.0183229 0.0074964 0.0519364 .0032422    .0334037 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9908         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0183          Pr(T > t) = 0.0092 
  
   
In table 2, we can see the results of the first model. In all three paired t-tests the average 
difference between the elections was positive and significant. In the 2009 set, the radical right 
performed on average 1.3% better in EU elections. In the 2014, the average difference was even 
higher at 2.3%, and in the combination of the 2009 and 2014 sets 1.8%. As we can see, all 
differences in means were significant. This supports the suggestion that the radical right will 
most likely perform better in European elections rather than in national parliamentary elections, 
and allows us to test for the possible explanations of the variation in the vote across elections.  
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Table 3 - Model2 and Model3 – OLS 
  Model 2    Model 3   
Variable 
Difference 
2014 EU and 
corresponding 
national 
elections  
Difference 
2009 EU and 
corresponding 
national 
elections 
Differences 
EU/national 
2009 and 2014 
combined 
  Radical right 
performance 
in national 
elections 2011-
2015 
  
    
              
Immigration the most important 
national concern 
0.21**(0.09) 0.21**(0.09) 0.20***(0.06)   -0.59 (0.36)   
              
Tendency not to trust the national 
government 
0.14 (0.09) 0.06 (0.04) 0.10**(0.05)   -0.29 ***(0.09)   
              
Unemployment         -0.58(0.58)   
              
Unemployment*immigration          5.32 (5.15)   
              
Electoral system  0.13***(0.04) 0.05**(0.02) 0.09***(0.02)       
              
Tendency not to trust the European 
Union 
-0.04(0.09) -0.05 (0.07) -0.04 (0.05)       
              
Constant -0.08(0.05) -0.02 (0.04)  -0.06(0.03)    0.32***(0.07)   
Observations 25 23 48   25   
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.36 0.48   0.29   
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,          
 
Table 3 shows the results of the two regression models. In the second model public 
concerns about immigration had a positive and significant impact on the difference in voteshare 
across national and European Union elections in both the 2009 and 2014 sets of elections, and an 
even more significant (p<0.01) impact when the two sets were combined. The effects of 
tendency to not trust the government were positive and close to significance (slightly above 
p<0.05) in the separate sets, and significant when the two sets were combined. Tendency not to 
trust the European Union had an insignificant impact in both the separate and combined sets of 
elections. Finally, electoral system had significant and positive effects on the difference in the 
vote for the radical right across the two types of elections in both the separate and combined sets.  
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In the third model, public concerns about immigration had an insignificant impact on the 
vote for the radical right in the most recent national elections. The tendency not to trust the 
national government had a significantly negative impact. The effects of unemployment rates 
alone were insignificant. Finally, the impact of the interaction between public concerns about 
immigration and unemployment rates on the radical right vote in national elections was positive, 
but insignificant. 
Some of the results are worth highlighting. The significant effects of public concerns 
about immigration in the second model and the insignificance of the same variable in the third 
model seems to confirm our hypothesis that the voters in European Union elections vote more 
sincerely and ideologically than in national elections. Voters in national elections are arguably 
more strategic, and therefore vote for the party that has a better chance of winning the seats in 
national parliament, no matter what their main concerns are. Moreover, it seems to confirm the 
assumption that since voters are not selecting the national government in European Union 
elections, they will be more prone to vote for the party that concentrates its agenda on a single 
issue and offers more radical solutions to the problem that for the voter matters the most. In 
national elections the voters will be less prone to vote for the same party as they will require the 
party to address multiple issues, and will be more careful to cast their votes for radical parties as 
there might be a possibility that these parties could govern them.  
The positive impact of the tendency not to trust the government on the difference in the 
vote between European Union and national elections, suggests the possibility of the protest vote 
in European Union elections. This means that, by voting for a radical right party in European 
Union elections, the voters try to send a message of discontent to the governing parties they have 
voted for, or would vote for, in national elections. It also seems to confirm the validity of the 
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second-order national elections model. The negative impact of the same variable on the success 
of the radical right in national elections should not be that surprising in this context. It suggests 
that, different to European Union elections, the vote for the radical right in national elections is 
not a protest vote. Once again it seems correct to assume that the voters vote more strategically 
rather than ideologically in national elections.  
The insignificant effects of tendency not to trust the European Union on the increase of 
the difference in the vote between European and national elections seems to confirm once again 
the validity of the second-order national elections model. It suggests that voters will most likely 
not vote for radical right parties because of their anti-EU agenda, and that voters still more likely 
conceive of European Union elections as second-order national contests. Finally, the significant 
and positive impact of the electoral system confirms that the difference in the voteshare of a 
radical right party will be larger when the party moves from majoritarian to proportional 
electoral rules, and confirms the hypothesis that mechanical and psychological factors of 
majoritarian systems in general influence the electoral fortunes of radical right parties. 
 
Conclusions 
This study provides several contributions to the ongoing debate about the electoral 
success of radical right parties. First, it is different to other studies about the radical right, 
because I explain the success of radical right parties through comparison of radical right parties’ 
performances across national and European Union elections. The impact of the type of elections 
on the success of the radical right has been rarely mentioned in the studies about the radical right, 
and even when it has been, it has not been given any large importance, and has mostly remained 
untested. Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) second-order national elections theory can be used as an 
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explanation of the difference in the vote for the radical right across national and European Union 
elections. The term ‘national’ is important here. European Union elections, although theoretically 
about European Union issues, will most likely still be conceived of by voters as national 
elections with a crucial difference: that national government is not elected in them. Radical right 
parties seem likely to profit from this kind of settling as some scholars have suggested (Reif 
1984; Almeida 2012). The results of the testing indeed seem to confirm the validity of the 
second-order national elections model in explaining the difference in vote for the radical right 
across national and European Union elections. It is possible that with time and enlargement of 
the powers of the European Parliament, European issues will begin to matter. However, that 
should not change the advantageous position of the radical right in these elections. Radical right 
parties are usually parties that address European Union issues a lot, especially recently. Their 
negative views on the European Union and the growing euroskepticism in European societies 
give these parties a good chance to gain success in European elections, even if they lose their 
second-order national contest nature. However, thus far the testing has not provided significant 
evidence of an impact of European Union issues on the difference in the vote for the radical right 
between national and European Union elections. The results of the testing also confirmed that the 
change in electoral system, from majoritarian to proportional, would have a significant impact on 
the radical right performance across the two types of elections. This should be a contribution to 
the debate on the general impact of institutional factors on the success of the radical right. 
Second, I also introduce a different kind of measurement for some key independent 
variables. Particularly, I emphasize the importance of measuring immigration in terms of 
peoples’ perceptions about it, rather than in terms of immigration rates. People usually do not 
know how many immigrants are in the country, and even if they do, it does not necessarily mean 
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that they are concerned with immigration and have negative views of it. Moreover, foreign-born 
populace rates cannot take into account the number of illegal immigrants in the country. In 
consequence, in this study, I use Eurobarometer public surveys about the most important national 
concerns, which I believe offer a better kind of measurement of immigration than foreign-born 
population rates.  
Third, I believe that I bring some important insights on the conceptualization of radical 
right parties. I do not believe that it is necessary to divide the radical right party family into 
subgroups, at least if one is interested in the causes of radical right success. Similarities between 
the parties across the assumed subfamilies, as well as disinclination of the most extremist parties 
to openly state their most extremist stances, make it very difficult to erect clear boundaries 
between the assumed subfamilies of the radical right. The subdivision of the radical right would 
also make testing even more problematic. Significant updates have been made to the list of 
radical right parties. Some of them have never appeared in studies on the radical right. I do not 
pretend to be an expert on all of the parties in my dataset. In some cases, I have found more 
evidence of the party’s radical right affiliation, and in other cases less. However, I believe that all 
of the parties included are conceived by the voters as radical right. Obviously, national level 
studies would be better fitted to confirm this assumption. 
Four, I include the vast majority of European countries, including those from Central and 
Eastern Europe. Most studies about the radical right are limited to Western Europe. There are 
several successful radical right parties in the CEE as well that should not be excluded. Because 
of the different socio-economic and socio-demographic realities, there might be large differences 
in the kind of issues, and the way the parties address them, between Western and Eastern Europe. 
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Not taking into account the CEE countries may therefore lead to misleading results in findings,  
as we have seen in some of the studies mentioned here.  
There are admittedly limitations to the study. The small number of observations might be 
problematic. However, I believe that the findings I have are a good start, and bring some 
important indications about the voters’ incentives to vote for the radical right in the different 
types of elections. It would be interesting to observe if the trend outlined in this study will 
continue. It might be also plausible for future research to look at the differences in radical right 
performance between national and regional elections. If Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) theory is fully 
valid, I would expect radical right parties to perform better in regional elections as well. 
Obviously, national level studies would be better suited to this kind of research. Finally, although 
I might have expressed some criticism of different theories, that does not mean that I do not 
recognize the contribution of all the authors mentioned in this article. Without their work, this 
study would hardly be possible.    
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APPENDIX A 
Radical right parties in the European Union 
Country Party 
    
Austria Freedom Party (FPO) 
Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) 
Bulgaria Attack (Ataka) 
Croatia Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) 
Cyprus ELAM 
Czech Republic Worker's party (DSSS)  
Party of Direct Democracy (SPD) 
  National Democracy (ND)  
Denmark Danish People's Party (DF) 
Estonia EKRE 
Finland Finns Party (PS) 
France National Front (FN) 
Germany National Democratic Party (NPD) 
Republikaner (Rep) 
Greece Golden Dawn 
Hungary Jobbik 
Italy League North (LN) 
Forza Nuova (FN) 
Casa Pound (CPI) 
Latvia National Alliance 
Lithuania Order and Justice (TT) 
Malta Imperium Europa (IE) 
Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV) 
Poland Congress of the New Right (KNP) 
National Movement (RN) 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 
Portugal National Renovator Party (PNR) 
Romania Greater Romania Party (PRM) 
Slovakia Slovakian National Party (SNS) 
People's Party - Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) 
Slovenia Slovenian National Party (SNS) 
Spain Espana 2000 
National Democracy (DN) 
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 
United Kingdom UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
British National Party (BNP) 
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